

The Arctic securitization and the crisis of multilateralism: A comparison between European countries, Canada, Russian Federation and the United States of America

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Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive review of the Securitization in the Arctic studying the impact of securitization processes into the Arctic multilateral institutions. It is expected that securitized sectors will not diminish the Arctic Countries multilateral participation meaning that States will not settle disputes outside the realm of multilateral institutions. In order to carry out this research, I am looking at the classical five securitization sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental sector analysing the Arctic Countries security strategies via discourse analysis from the period 2007-2014. The analysis leads me to conclude that securitization is not diminishing multilateral participation following the premises of neoliberal theories and rejects the realist premises. Nevertheless, there is an exception; the US in the political sector is diminishing its multilateral participation.

Keywords: Securitization – Multilateralism – Arctic Countries – Neoliberalism

(A) INTRODUCTION

International Relations studies focus on territory, peace, conflict, and security and the Arctic Circle is an example of such relationship. Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has become a region of renewed and profound geopolitical interest to decision-makers. The Arctic Race to conquer the region began in the early twenty-century where the first case of a sovereignty claim recorded is found in Paris with the signature of the Treaty of Svalbard the 9th of February of 1920¹. Nevertheless, the Arctic Circle became at the end of the 80's with Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk a dormant region.² But, in August the 3rd 2007 a Russian flag-planting under the North Pole increased international attention and media interest after years of peaceful relationships: the Arctic regained geopolitical importance³. For instance, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay clamoured "[t]his isn't the fifteenth century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say we're claiming this territory".⁴ In fact, within only a few years after the event, almost all Arctic Countries published a foreign policy strategy towards the Arctic clarifying interests, policy aims,

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¹ F. Lasserre, 'Frontières maritimes dans l'Arctique: le droit de la mer est-il un cadre applicable?', *CERISCOPE Frontières*, 2011.

² M. Gorbachev, 'General Secretary Gorbachev's Speech Speech in Murmansk, October 1987', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 1987.

³ C. J. Chivers, 'Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed' *The New York Times*, 2007.

⁴ *Ibid.*

security challenges and relevant modes of governance⁵. The Arctic has recently begun to shift from the military issues of strategic security that were previously equivalent to security within the region, such as the creation of the Distant Early Warning system, to the broader challenges like climate change. Indeed, the Arctic has shifted from a region of scientific interest into a region of competing commercial, national security, and environmental concerns, with profound implications for the international legal and political system. Nevertheless, growing attention has been paid to Arctic security, but there is little understanding of what has actually occurred. For that reason, in this paper, I am paying attention to the Copenhagen School securitization theory reviewing the theory through the Paris School. As it is stated by the theory, in the post-Cold War era, the agenda has been broadened from the military sector to the political, societal, economic and environmental sector, where the Arctic is no exception of such trend and could provide a plausible explanation as why has the Arctic securitization not diminished multilateral participation.

To deduce the validity of the theoretical arguments, it comprehends the analysis of the Arctic Countries securitization and its impact on multilateral institutions in the region from 2007 to 2014. I am focusing on discourse analysis to analyse the relevant policy documents of the Arctic Countries to identify if securitization has taken place or not. The data generated from such analysis is therefore used to explore the validity of the hypothesized relationship between securitization and multilateral institutions. The findings of the paper contribute to understand Arctic security and states behaviour in the region vis-à-vis institutions. At the same time, it can contribute to the understanding of similar regions like the South China Sea.

(B) LITERATURE REVIEW

(1) Securitization theory

Since the end of the Cold War, the reconstruction of the major security challenges in a post-bipolar world has led to a gradual expansion of the concept of security initiated by academics, especially by the critical theorists of the Copenhagen School, and by practitioners⁶. The Arctic Circle is an example of such expansion, and it has moved from a dormant region at the end of the 80's to a region of renewed and profound geopolitical interest to decision-makers moving. Nowadays, almost all Arctic Countries published a foreign policy strategy towards the Arctic clarifying interests, policy aims, security challenges and relevant modes of

⁵ A. Stuhl, 'The politics of the 'New North': putting history and geography at stake in Arctic futures', 3 *The Polar Journal* (2013) 94–119, at 1 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.783280]

⁶ K. Åtland, 'Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?' 33 *Comparative Strategy* (2014) 145–166, at 2 [doi: 10.1080/01495933.2014.897121]

governance⁷. Moreover, the securitization theory has disaggregated the classical notion of state security into several sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental. The theory states when a threat becomes a national security issue depend not just on what is the type of threat and how much the recipient state perceives such threat, but also on the intensity with which the threat operates. The movement of an issue from politicized to securitized is called a securitizing move, but the move does not imply that the referred object becomes securitized in itself.⁸ In other words, the securitizing move is the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied by a strategy to act. Only speaking of an issue in terms of a threat does not meet the criteria of a securitizing move. What is required for a securitizing move is a policy action. However, it must be accepted or rejected by the target audience. In essence, the securitizing move is what permits to move from a politicized issue to a securitized issue.

Nevertheless, over time have some critiques have surfaced. One of the most notable critics of the theory, Williams,⁹ argued that different kinds of speech might constitute an act. For Williams the process of securitization and more precisely the securitizing moves are an attempt by the sovereign to decide the exception and consequently remove the sector from democratic debate. On that sense, Buzan et al. presented a spectrum of how issues might be weighted (Non-politicized; Politicized; or Securitized) trying to represent securitization as a threshold which is linked to democratic societies.¹⁰ To put it differently, for the Copenhagen School the sector is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such and must gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures.¹¹ Nonetheless, within their model, there is no framework to assess whether securitizations succeed or fail.

Stritzel argues that too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality.¹² Stritzel critiqued the under-theorization of the speaker-audience relations. He pointed out that, in empirical studies, we cannot always figure out clearly when and why an audience is most relevant, what implications several audiences have, and when exactly an audience is

⁷ M. McDonald, 'Constructivism', in Williams, P. (eds.), *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Routledge, New York, 2014), at 68–72.

⁸ B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998).

⁹ M. C. Williams, 'Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics', 47 *International Studies Quarterly* (2003) 511–31, at 4 [doi: 10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x]

¹⁰ B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde, *supra* note 9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² H. Stritzel, 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond' 13 *European Journal International Relations* (2007) 357–83, at 3 [doi: 10.1177/1354066107080128].

persuaded.¹³ In the case of the Arctic the intended audience is the Arctic Countries governments. Furthermore, he argued that the discourse of securitization must be understood as situated within a relationship between speaker-audience and within a context that predates the actual securitizing act. What makes a securitizing move successful is, for Stritzel the extent to which the actor has the power to make the threat and the discursive weight of that threat. Along those lines, the paper finds its theoretical basis in the Paris School, where Balzacq¹⁴ offers a model of the social aspect of securitization that includes the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both the speaker and the listener bring to the interaction. In posing the question of strategic or pragmatic practice, Balzacq argues that the positive outcome of securitization, whether it is strong or weak, lies with the securitizing actors' choice of determining appropriate times within which the recognition, including the integration of imprinting object or threat by the masses is facilitated. In brief, the pragmatic act is the attempt to explain why an issue is securitized by analysing the interaction between the power and the identity of the actors (being both the securitizer and the audience) involved in the securitization process.¹⁵ That is to say, Balzacq argues that securitization sometimes occurs and produces social and political consequences without the explicit assent of an audience.¹⁶ Related to the Arctic Circle, is central to my analysis that the audience is determinative of the form of securitizing move. Even if those audiences are internal or organizational without an audience a securitizing move is not possible in the Arctic.

(2) Securitization and multilateralism in the Arctic Circle

Nowadays, the Arctic is relevant because of sovereignty claims, increasing competition regarding natural resources, commercial activities, and environmental concerns related to the flora and fauna. Thus, this paper will follow the classical sectors pointed out by the Copenhagen School developing five hypotheses. That is to say, all five hypotheses will follow the same structure and foundation, i.e. that *in comparing states, the more the sector (military, political, societal, economic or environmental) is undergoing a securitization process, the less likely is multilateral participation*.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ T. Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context', 11 *European Journal International Relations* (2005) 171-201, at 2 [doi: 10.1177/1354066105052960].

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ T. Balzacq, 'The policy tools of securitization: Information exchange, EU foreign and interior policies' 46 *Journal Common Market Studies* (2008) 75-100, at 1 [doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00768.x].

(C) DATA ANALYSIS

(1) Securitization, politicization and non-politicization

In the analysis of the Independent Variable and the five sectors of securitization I have found the following. Firstly, the environmental sector is the only sector where the parties are experiencing a process of securitization. Secondly, in the societal sector no-securitization process is undergone by any of the Arctic Countries. Thirdly, in the military sector only the Russian Federation and the US (both military powers and members of the UNSC) are undergoing a process of securitization. Fourthly, the US, Canada, the Russian Federation, and Norway are securitizing the political sector. Finally, only the US, the Russian Federation, and Norway are securitizing the economic sector.

(a) *Military Hypothesis*

(i) US

Analysing the US military discourse, “the US has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests”.¹⁷ At the same time, the US is emphasizing that if there is policy of hostility faced by the country, “the US Homeland and the Department of Defense (hereinafter DOD) will remain prepared to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the homeland”.¹⁸ The US’ discourse is constructing perceived threats by addressing protection, defence, authority, and sovereignty focused on the freedom of the seas, terrorism or missile defence.¹⁹ Furthermore, the US is building its discourse by focusing in two main chapters “Ensure security, support safety and promote defence cooperation” and “Advanc[ing] US security interest”.²⁰ As a result, the US is building its military discourse tackling the presence of perceived threats such as terrorism in order to build a securitized military discourse.

(ii) *Canada*

In the discourse analysis of the Canadian military sector, there is no mention done to any kind of policy discourse or security discourse based on perceived threats. It is possible to conclude that there is no-securitization or politicization of the military sector in the Arctic. In fact, there is a non-politicization of the Canadian military sector discourse.

¹⁷ The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive*, Washington D.C: The White House, 2007.

¹⁸ US Department of Defense, *Arctic Strategy*, 2013.

¹⁹ The White House, *supra* note 18; and US Department of Defense, *supra* note 19.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

(iii) *Russian Federation*

The Russian Federation's military discourse addresses "the sphere of the military security, defence, and protection of the Russian border in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation". Russia's discourse considers necessary to allow military formations from the Armed Forces capable of ensuring security under various military and political circumstances [in the Arctic]²¹. The Russians are implying in terms of security, defence, and protection the existence of perceived threats like terrorism and "the deployment of troops' contingents of foreign states on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation".²² Finally, the Russian discourse associated with the military sector is based on the existence of perceived threats, where the security provided by the military to confront it is capital. By that, I can infer the securitization of the Russian discourse in the military sector.

(iv) *Sweden*

The Swedish discourse regarding the military sector is not securitized or politicized. In fact, there is no mention in the country's documents analysed of such a concern. On the one hand there is no policy discourse, on the other there is not security discourse accompanied with perceived threats. It leads me to qualify the Swedish discourse as non-politicized.

(v) *Norway*

In the discourse analysis of the Norwegian military sector there is no mention of any kind of policy or security policy based on perceived threats. I therefore infer that, there is no securitization or politicization of the discourse, in fact there is non-politicization of the sector.

(vi) *Denmark*

Analysing the military discourse of the Danish, there is no reference to any kind of policy or of a security policy based on perceived threats. There is no securitization or politicization; in fact, the Danish military sector discourse is a non-politicization

(vii) *Finland*

Analysing the military discourse of Finland there is no mention of any kind of policy discourse or security discourse based on perceived threats. I infer that there is no securitization or politicization of the military sector in the Arctic. Actually, there is a non-politicization of the Finnish military sector discourse.

²¹ President of the Russian Federation, *The Foundations of the Russian Federation's State Policy in the Arctic and Beyond*, Moscow, 2008.

²² President of the Russian Federation, *supra* note 22; and President of the Russian Federation, *The development strategy of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation*, Moscow, 2013.

(viii) *Iceland*

In the discourse analysis of the Icelandic the military sector, there is no-securitization or politicization it is not securitized or politicized. No mention is done in the analysed country's documents of such a concern. On the one hand there is no policy discourse, on the other there is not security discourse accompanied with perceived threats. It leads me to infer the Icelandic discourse as non-politicized.

(b) *Political Hypothesis*(i) *US*

The US political sector discourse is associated with the military discourse. That is to say, the US priority in the Arctic Circle is to “protect the American people, our sovereign territory and rights, natural resources, and interests of the US”²³ where sovereignty recognition within a security frame is key.²⁴ Moreover, the framing of protection and security is accompanied by the existence of perceived threats. I am able to infer such statement because as it is the case in the military sector that “the US has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests”.²⁵ Additionally, the US perceived threats to sovereignty are deterred and countered by the goal to assure the freedom of the seas.²⁶ The US is securitizing the political sector discourse in the Arctic where the US is wishing to preserve the freedom of the seas, and its sovereign rights against perceived threats.

(ii) *Canada*

The Canadian political discourse identifies as a priority “our Arctic sovereignty”. In fact, sovereignty is addressed within the context of safety and law enforcement. The main goal is to assure the “presence in the North, enhancing our stewardship of the region, defining our domain”.²⁷ Canada stresses in its discourse the existence of perceived threats and by that the need for protection. That is to say, “Protecting national sovereignty, and the integrity of our borders, is the first and foremost responsibility of a national government. We are resolved to protect Canadian sovereignty throughout our Arctic”.²⁸ Moreover, by speaking about protection and security, Canada is identifying the existence as of perceived threats. On that

²³ The White House, *National strategy for the Arctic Region*, Washington D.C: Seal of the President of the United States, 2013.

²⁴ The White House, *supra* note 18; US Department of Defense, *supra* note 19.

²⁵ The White House, *supra* note 18.

²⁶ The White House, *supra* note 25.

²⁷ Government of Canada, *Canada's Northern Strategy*, Ottawa: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status, 2009; Government of Canada, *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad*, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2010.

²⁸ Government of Canada, *supra* note 28

argument, Canada speaks clearly regarding the sovereignty of the High North of existing “threats to Canadian security”.²⁹ To put it differently, Canada, speaking in security and protection terms, is speaking about perceived threats. In other words, the political sector discourse of Canada is securitized.

(iii) Russian Federation

The Russian Federation political discourse is similar to the US discourse as it is associated with the military discourse. In short, the Russian discourse and its sovereignty are committed to “defence and protection of the Russian border in the Arctic”.³⁰ Furthermore, sovereignty claims, protection and the already sovereign territory are key in the Russian discourse.³¹ These claims and protection are constructed within the existence of perceived threats. These threats are implied in the statement of the Russian Federation to protect the Russian borders in the Arctic using its military security and defence capabilities.³² The Russian discourse perceives these threats mainly by the “deployment of troop contingents of foreign states on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation”.³³ In other words, the political sector discourse of the Russian Federation is securitized, identifying threats to sovereignty in the chapter “the main risks and threats”.³⁴

(iv) Sweden

In the discourse analysis of the political sector of Sweden, there is no reference to any kind of policy discourse or security discourse based on perceived threats. There is no securitization or politicization of the political sector in the Arctic. In fact, there is a non-politicization of the Swedish political sector discourse.

(v) Norway

The political discourse of the Norwegian is framing the Arctic as a “fundamental prerequisite for Norwegian activity in the North”.³⁵ Moreover, Norway stresses the control of the territory and sovereignty as key points in the discourse.³⁶ At the same time, the country is accompanying the importance of sovereignty in the discourse with a security frame based in the presence of military forces “the presence and activity of the Norwegian armed forces in

²⁹ Government of Canada, *Canada First: Defence Strategy*, Ottawa, 2008.

³⁰ President of the Russian Federation, *supra* note 23.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ President of the Russian Federation, *supra* note 23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *New Building Blocks in the North: The next step in the Government's High North Strategy*. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

³⁶ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 36; and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*, Norwegian. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012.

the High North [...] to maintain stability and security in the region” with the main goal of protection and safeguarding the “sovereign rights in our 200-mile zones, exercise authority, and carry out surveillance, intelligence and crisis management”.³⁷ Actually, the political discourse is based on control and sovereignty claims and a clearly perceived threat (assuring the 200-mile zones right) constructed in the chapter “Security and Defence”.³⁸ The Norwegian discourse is therefore in the political sector securitized.

(vi) *Denmark*

The Danish discourse in the political sector has no mention of any security policies and implied perceived threats. In fact, the discourse of Denmark associated with the political sector is not securitized, but politicized. On the one hand, it is clear, that the Danish discourse seeks to exercise, claim, and enforce sovereignty in the Arctic Circle understood as a “responsibility of the realm’s central authorities”.³⁹ On the other hand, Denmark looks for its sovereignty claims in an inconsistently way through defence strategies. Nevertheless, the inconsistent use of defence strategies makes impossible to develop a clear framing of the political sector within the securitization discourse.⁴⁰ Therefore, that is why the political sector is considered politicized and not securitized.

(vii) *Finland*

The Finish discourse regarding the political sector it is not securitized or politicized. In fact, there is no mention done in the analysed country documents of such concern. It leads me to define the Finish discourse as non-politicized.

(viii) *Iceland*

The Icelandic political discourse secures the country interests in the Arctic Region. In fact, Iceland stresses the “importance that Iceland secures its position as a coastal state” looking for “equal footing with other coastal states in the region”⁴¹ in order to solve the management of the Arctic where sovereignty claims are on the agenda. Nevertheless, such discourse it is not accompanied with an identification of perceived threats or the need of a security policy. I can therefore conclude, that the Icelandic discourse it is not securitized but politicized.

³⁷ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 36.

³⁸ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 37.

³⁹ Denmark, Greenland, and The Faroe Islands, *Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011– 2020*. Government of Denmark; Government of the Faroes; Government of Greenland, 2011.

⁴⁰ Government of Denmark, *Danish defence agreement 2010 – 2014*, Copenhagen, 2010; Government of Denmark, *Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017*, Copenhagen, 2013.

⁴¹ Parliament of Iceland, *A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy*, 2011.

(c) *Societal Hypothesis*(i) *US*

In the discourse analysis of the societal sector of the US, there is no reference of any kind of policy or security policy based on perceived threats. By that, there is no-securitization or politicization; in fact, there is no-politicization.

(ii) *Canada*

Canada is constructing its societal discourse focusing on societal development and governance of Northern societies to unlock the North's potential⁴². Nonetheless, even if the societal discourse is central, it is not accompanied by a security discourse. That is to say, there are not perceived threats associated with the societal sector discourse and therefore the sector it is not securitized but politicized.

(iii) *Russian Federation*

The Russian Federation is developing a societal sector discourse within the Arctic focused on the preservation of communities in the High North. In fact, the Russian discourse is based on the need of improving infrastructure, education and health being addressed as "development priorities".⁴³ The Russian Federation wants to preserve "native people's culture, language, and traditions" in the Arctic.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the Russian societal discourse it is not framed within a security discourse. The country wants to preserve and to develop the High North communities within a politicized discourse but not a securitized one. Consequently, there are not perceived threats.

(iv) *Sweden*

In its societal discourse the Swedish government, is laying out the "right of indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their identity, culture, knowledge transfer and traditional trades must be upheld"⁴⁵ being considered a priority for the government. Nevertheless, such discourse is not accompanied with a security discourse. Therefore, the Swedish societal sector discourse is not securitized but politicized.

(v) *Norway*

Norway is also tackling the societal sector in the Arctic. In fact, the government is wishing to ensure "the culture and livelihood of indigenous peoples".⁴⁶ The goal to ensure the well-being

⁴² Government of Canada, *supra* note 28.

⁴³ President of the Russian Federation, *supra* note 23.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Swedish Ministry for Foreign affairs. *Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region*, Stockholm, 2011.

⁴⁶ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 37.

of indigenous people is not accompanied by a security discourse. There are not perceived threats associated within the societal discourse. That is to say, the societal sector linked to the Norwegian discourse it is not securitized but politicized.

(vi) *Denmark*

The Danish societal discourse is aiming to address the communities living in Greenland. The discourse wants to preserve customs, culture and ways of living of these communities and at the same time to improve the living conditions via the possible economic activities permitted within the region.⁴⁷ Such issues are not constructed or accompanied with a security discourse. In fact, there is no reference to the existence of perceived threats. Consequently, I conclude that the Danish societal discourse is not securitized, but in fact is politicized.

(vii) *Finland*

The Finnish societal discourse in the Arctic wants to “improve the living conditions of indigenous peoples so as to allow communities and cultures to survive and evolve on their own terms”⁴⁸ and to preserve “culture and livelihoods of indigenous peoples”.⁴⁹ At the same time, Finland’s discourse could be framed within the security field. In fact, it is stressed that “the Arctic region is greatly affected by a wide range of global changes necessary to promote the well-being of the local population; and secure the viability of the traditional cultures of the indigenous people”.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, a security speech is not taking place. Therefore, it is not securitized. Indeed, within the discourse, there is no presence of perceived threats or security policies, leading to a politicized Finnish societal sector.

(viii) *Iceland*

The Icelandic discourse addressing the societal sector is focused on the promotion of Icelandic societal development.⁵¹ Therefore, societal preservation is present in the societal discourse. Thus, the Icelandic discourse is focused on improving the living standards of the indigenous peoples in order to “contribute to the preservation of the unique culture and way of life” to ensure the “cultural uniqueness” of Arctic societies.⁵² That is to say, no framing of the discourse within the security language is done. In other words, there are not perceived threats and therefore the Icelandic discourse it is not securitized but politicized.

⁴⁷ Denmark, Greenland, and The Faroe Islands, *supra* note 40.

⁴⁸ Prime Minister’s Office, *Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013*, no. 16. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2013.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Parliament of Iceland, *supra* note 42; and Icelandic for Foreign Affairs, *Iceland in the High North*, Reykjavík, 2009.

⁵² Parliament of Iceland, *supra* note 42; and Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *A Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal, and Military Factors*, Reykjavík, 2009.

(d) *Economic Hypothesis*

(i) US

The US discourse aims to address the economic sector in the Arctic. In fact, the US is identifying the region as a region of vital interest where the US wants to make profit of “the emerging economic opportunities in the region”.⁵³ By that, the discourse is focused on the exploitation of energy resources, enhanced infrastructure and enforced protection/safety of maritime commerce.⁵⁴ Moreover, tackling the central argument of this paper, the US economic sector “will be guided by our central interests in the Arctic region, which include providing for the security of the US; protecting the free flow of resources and commerce”.⁵⁵ That is to say, by addressing the sector using security and protection as key points, the US is implying the existence of perceived threats in the Arctic. In brief, the US is addressing the economic sector within security policies “economic and energy security”⁵⁶ leading to identify the economic sector as securitized.

(ii) *Canada*

Canada addresses its economic discourse by focusing on the development and economic promotion of the Arctic. In fact, Canada is stating such issues as a way to assure “prosperity of Northerners and all Canadians for generations”⁵⁷. Nevertheless, I cannot consider the Canadian economic discourse as securitized, but as politicized. This is because the economic discourse is not framed within a security discourse, and therefore there are not perceived threats.

(iii) *Russian Federation*

In its economic discourse the Russian Federation is wishing to promote the economic activities within the region. In fact, the Russians want to increase the use of the North Sea passage as a unified transportation link considered as a priority for the country. This passage is accompanied by the expansion of the market of the region willing to increase the commercial activities.⁵⁸ Moreover, the economic development and promotion is framed within a security discourse accompanied by perceived threats. In fact, the military is ensuring “the security of the economic activities of the Russian Federation”.⁵⁹ Therefore, being the

⁵³ The White House, *supra* note 24.

⁵⁴ The White House, *supra* note 24; and US Department of Defense, *supra* note 19.

⁵⁵ The White House, *supra* note 24.

⁵⁶ The White House, *supra* note 18; The White House, The White House, *supra* note 24; and US Department of Defense, *supra* note 19.

⁵⁷ Government of Canada, *supra* note 28.

⁵⁸ President of the Russian Federation, *supra* note 23.

⁵⁹ President of the Russian Federation, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, Moscow, 2010.

economic sector associated to the national security of the country permits me to conclude the following. The Russian economic discourse in the Arctic is based in a security discourse focused on perceived threats as it shows the framing of the economic sector into the national security discourse. Consequently, the economic discourse is securitized.

(iv) *Sweden*

The Swedish discourse is tackling the economic Arctic discourse focusing on the development and economic promotion of the region. In essence, the economic promotion is a priority, coupled with the sustainability of resources.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, these priorities are accompanied by a discourse of security associated with perceived threats. Here, the Swedish economic discourse is not securitized, but politicized.

(v) *Norway*

The economic discourse of the Norwegian regarding the Arctic is addressing the following. The exploitation of the resources (oil and gas) is for Norway and its High North “essential in securing welfare and employment”.⁶¹ At the same time, Norway wants to exploit the resources securing welfare and employment by focusing mainly on infrastructures and research.⁶² Norway is framing its discourse within a securitising discourse willing to confront the perceived threats. It is building its discourse around security, interests and defence “Norway has important assets and interests to defend”⁶³ or “Norway must be in a position to uphold its sovereignty and sovereign rights and to exercise authority in order to safeguard our interests”.⁶⁴ The country is implying the existence of perceived threats needing security policies to face them. Therefore, the Norwegian economic discourse in the Arctic is securitized.

(vi) *Denmark*

The Danish discourse associated with the Arctic regarding the economic sector is politicized but not securitized. That is to say, the economic development of the Arctic is addressed as a central part of the Danish discourse; nevertheless, it is never tackled as a security problem. Therefore, it does not imply any perceived threats.

⁶⁰ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 46.

⁶¹ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 36.

⁶² Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 37.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Norwegian Defence 2008*, Oslo, 2008.

(vii) *Finland*

Finland is also aiming to address within its discourse the economic sector in the Arctic. As it is the case for Canada, they are focusing on the development and economic promotion of the region where the Finnish are “engaged in the general efforts to exploit the economic opportunities emerging in the northern regions”.⁶⁵ In fact, the Finnish wants to “improve opportunities for Finnish companies to benefit from the Arctic”.⁶⁶ That is to say, Finland is not framing any security discourse into the economic sector. Therefore, I cannot infer any perceived threats. As a consequence, the Finnish economic discourse is not securitized but politicized.

(viii) *Iceland*

The Icelandic discourse tackling the economic sector is linked to the economic issues of development and promotion of activities in the region. In fact, the government of Iceland is focusing its policies on seizing the opportunities to promote Icelandic societal and economic development.⁶⁷ The discourse is politicized and not securitized based in trade relations, increased transportation, tourism, and improving the infrastructures of the Arctic to permit a major use of resources.⁶⁸ In other words, there is no security policy and by that no implied and perceived threat.

(e) *Environmental Hypothesis*(i) *US*

The US discourse regarding the environmental sector in the Arctic can be framed as a policy question. In fact, the environmental sector is one of vital interest to the US. The US is emphasizing the need for “protection of the unique and changing environment of the Arctic”. Similarly, it is stated the need for the sustainability of the regions resources and to monitor the impact of climate change in order to achieve “environmental security in the region”.⁶⁹ The US discourse is constructed via the words of protecting and safeguarding the region “the policy of the US [is] to protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources”.⁷⁰ By the same token, the perceived threats need to be focus on “combating the climatic changes”.⁷¹ In other words, the US policies are based on the “Environmental Protection and

⁶⁵ Prime Minister’s Office, *supra* note 49.

⁶⁶ Prime Minister’s Office, *Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2010*. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2010.

⁶⁷ Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 52; and Parliament of Iceland, *supra* note 42.

⁶⁸ Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 53; and Parliament of Iceland, *supra* note 42.

⁶⁹ The White House, *supra* note 18; The White House, *supra* note 24; and US Department of Defense, *supra* note 19.

⁷⁰ The White House, *supra* note 18.

⁷¹ The White House, *supra* note 24.

Conservation of Natural Resources” and on the “Protect[ion of] the Arctic Environment”⁷² implemented as security policies. The US is securitizing the environmental sector in the Arctic, where the perceived threats are addressed with security policies.

(ii) *Canada*

Canada is building its environmental discourse focusing on protection and sustainability. That is to say, the country is stressing as “threaten[ing] the region’s fragile ecosystem” climate change, commercial utilization, pollution and exploitation of natural resources. Canada considers the protection of “our environmental heritage”⁷³ as a top priority. In essence, they are framing their discourse within the concepts of safety, threat, guard, and protection “Protecting our environmental heritage [...] Canada is committed to helping ensure their ecosystems are safeguarded for future generation”.⁷⁴ Indeed, by using this security language e.g. “protecting the Arctic environment” or “protecting Northern lands and waters”⁷⁵, Canada is implying the existence of perceived threats. Finally, Canada is not only implying the existence of perceived threats but at the same time they build a security policy discourse.⁷⁶ Thus, Canada has securitized its environmental discourse.

(iii) *Russian Federation*

The Russian Federation identifies the environmental sector within the need to protect “the unique ecological system” constructed as a main national interest.⁷⁷ Moreover, pollution protection and sustainability of the resources are part of the Russian discourse. The Russian Federation states the need to confront the perceived threats and therefore to protect and securitize the Arctic “in order to protect the environment and environmental security in the Arctic zone, the Russian Federation shall provide for [...] elimination of the environmental damage caused by past economic, military and other activities in the arctic zone”.⁷⁸ Those policies implemented to confront the perceived threats are included “in the area of ecological security”.⁷⁹ Therefore, the Russian environmental sector is a clear example of environmental securitization.

(iv) *Sweden*

Sweden is also identifying the environmental sector in the Arctic discourse. More

⁷² The White House, *supra* note 18; and The White House, *supra* note 24.

⁷³ Government of Canada, *supra* note 28.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Government of Canada, *supra* note 30.

⁷⁷ President of the Russian Federation, *supra* note 23.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

concretely, they are pointing out the protection of the Arctic regarding “climate change and the environment” as a priority. Hence, issues such ecology preservation and pollution are present in the discourse.⁸⁰ Such priority is constructed within a perceived threats discourse where “resource extraction in the Arctic significantly increases the risk of local emissions directly impacting the local environment and joint efforts are required to increase protection of the unique Arctic environment and the living environment for the Arctic population”.⁸¹ In other words, speaking of protection and security from threats, such as pollution, climate change and uncontrolled resource extraction, implies existing securitization within the Swedish Arctic discourse. In brief, climate change is tackled as an important threat within a security policy and environmental issues such as oil spills or nuclear accidents are identified as part of “environmental protection”⁸² where the existence of perceived threats regarding the environmental sector protection and sustainability is inferred. That is to say, these perceived threats associated with the Arctic’s environment leads me to identify the environmental sector of the Swedish discourse as securitized.

(v) Norway

Norway’s discourse states that the environmental sector needs to implement a “sound resource management and efforts to protect the environment”.⁸³ Hence, issues such as pollution from oil extraction, increased transport, and climate change, are included into the environmental sector discourse.⁸⁴ Moreover, such discourse is framed within a securitizing discourse. In fact, Norway addresses the sector with the goal of protecting and safeguarding the Arctic against threats to “ecosystems, ecological goods and services and biodiversity”.⁸⁵ In brief, framing these issues as threatening implies the presence of perceived threats in the environmental sector. In fact, is it is tackled by the government as “environmental protection and environmental problems”⁸⁶ leading me to consider the Norwegian environmental discourse as securitized.

(vi) Denmark

Denmark’s Arctic discourse also identifies the environment as a sector needing environmental protection and assuring sustainability from perceived threats in terms of flora and fauna. As the government laid out “it is important to do an overall assessment and monitoring of all the

⁸⁰ Swedish Ministry for Foreign affairs, *supra* note 46.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 37.

⁸⁴ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 36; and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 37.

⁸⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 37.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

threats to and impacts on the Arctic for the protection of nature and the environment”.⁸⁷ That is to say, these perceived threats associated with the environmental sector need a government able to protect “the environment and biodiversity”.⁸⁸ In other words, the identification of a need to protect the environment and what it implies to the Arctic and the necessity to protect it from threats leads me to consider the environmental sector within the Danish Arctic discourse as securitizes.

(vii) *Finland*

The Finnish government emphasizes in its environmental sector discourse that an “environmental perspective must be taken into account in all activities in the region”.⁸⁹ Moreover, it states the need to preserve the Arctic’s environment including but not limited to sustainable utilization of resources, and avoiding pollution and/or nuclear contamination.⁹⁰ Furthermore, by addressing issues like threat and protection, Finland is securitising the Arctic. In fact, Finland is identifying commercial activity as “the biggest threat to the Arctic ecosystem”.⁹¹ Together with commercial activity, the Finnish government is tackling the sector within the “environmental protection in the Arctic region”.⁹² To put it differently, by addressing the necessity of protection, it is implied the existence of a threat, by that I conclude that the environmental sector has been securitized.

(viii) *Iceland*

Iceland’s discourse is framing the environmental sector as “one of the most pressing interests of Iceland”.⁹³ The country is focused on protecting the fauna and flora and the sustainable use of its resources.⁹⁴ Iceland is identifying climate change as a threat, as well as, the increased use of resources, nuclear and oil splits, pollution and erosion.⁹⁵ To face such perceived threats, the government is implementing policies of “security cooperation” and “resources and environmental protection”⁹⁶ in order to protect and save the environment in the region “it is obvious that the main threat in the area is no longer a possible interstate conflict but rather the danger of environmental accidents related to the utilization of resources and the largely

⁸⁷ Denmark, Greenland, and The Faroe Islands, *supra* note 40.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Prime Minister’s Office, *supra* note 49.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Prime Minister’s Office, *supra* note 67.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 53.

⁹⁴ Parliament of Iceland, Parliament of Iceland, *supra* note 42.

⁹⁵ Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 53; Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 52; and Parliament of Iceland, Parliament of Iceland, *supra* note 42.

⁹⁶ Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 53.

increasing traffic”.⁹⁷ Consequently, the implementation of policies of security cooperation and environmental protection imply the existence of perceived threats and by that the securitization of the Icelandic environmental discourse.

(2) Securitization, politicization, non-politicization and multilateralism in the Arctic

Looking at the effects of the Independent Variable in the Dependent Variable, I observe that securitization has diminished multilateral participation only in the political sector in the case of the US. As for the rest of states where one or several sectors have undergone a process of securitization, this process has not diminished multilateral participation, but resulted in cooperation and agreements to solve the threat to national security. At the same time, the US has been the only securitizing actor in the economic sector to act unilaterally regarding commercial fisheries.

(a) *Military Hypothesis*

I find out that the US is not diminishing its multilateral participation as it hypothesized. The US is operating either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard⁹⁸ their national security interests. Actually, the US is working with the North Alliance Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO), already present in the High North with its integrated air-defence system, including fighters on alert and airborne warning and control surveillance flights adopting a higher profile.⁹⁹ NATO has taken over from the US a scaled-down version of air patrolling over Iceland.¹⁰⁰ Sweden and Finland, of great strategic significance to Russia and still officially neutral, have increased their collaboration with NATO, both directly through the Partnership for Peace and indirectly through their participation in EU defence initiatives such as the Nordic Battlegroup.¹⁰¹ Similarly, military cooperation in the Arctic and environs is growing among Nordic Countries and between Nordic neutrals and NATO. Nevertheless, the goal is to maintain the stability as a common strategic objective.

Finally, active Nordic defence cooperation within Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support, Nordic Supportive Defence Structures and Nordic Armaments Cooperation is already in place. Nordic leaders pursuing a more intensive form of security

⁹⁷ Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *supra* note 52.

⁹⁸ The White House, *supra* note 18, *Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive*. Washington D.C: The White House, 2009.

⁹⁹ L. Coffey, ‘NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities’, 3646 *Heritage Foundation* (2012)

¹⁰⁰ A.-M. Brady, ‘Arctic security in a time of climate change’, 3 *The Polar Journal* (2013) 257-265, at 1 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.783272]

¹⁰¹ T. Pedersen, ‘The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries’, 37 *ODIL* (2006) pp. 339-358; M. Blunden, ‘The New Problem of Arctic Stability’, 51 *Survival Lond* (2009), at 5 [doi: 10.1080/00396330903309899]; M. Blunden, ‘Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route’, 88 *International Affairs* (2012) 115-129, at 1 [doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01060.x].

cooperation have an eye on developments in Russia. Swedish Defence Minister Tolgfors openly conceded in 2008 that, although the security situation in the Nordic region was stable, “our decision to cooperate more closely is happening against a background in which Russia is raising its foreign policy ambitions”.¹⁰²

At the same time, the Russian Federation, in contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic¹⁰³, pursues three major goals in the Arctic: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia’s sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities.¹⁰⁴ The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race.¹⁰⁵ The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.¹⁰⁶

(b) Political Hypothesis

When I am looking at the impact of the securitization of the political sector into multilateral institutions, I need to look at the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS). Arctic Countries seek to define their own northern national boundaries and file individual applications to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf as the overarching regulatory body in accordance with the UNCLOS. It leads me to conclude that the political sector is far from being a sector of rising tensions due to competing territorial or economic claims as rationalists theories predicted.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² S. Knecht and K. Keil, ‘Arctic geopolitics revisited: spatialising governance in the circumpolar North’, 3 *The Polar Journal* (2013) 178–203, at 1 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.783276]

¹⁰³ The Associated Press, ‘New Russian Military Doctrine Says NATO Top Threat’, *The New York Times*, 2014; and P. Bonet, ‘Una nueva guerra fría se cierne sobre el Ártico’, *El País*, 2015 [Accessed: 10-Aug-2015].

¹⁰⁴ V. Konyshov and A. Sergunin, ‘Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?’, 30 *Defence & Security Analysis* (2014) 323–335, at 4 [doi: 10.1080/14751798.2014.948276]

¹⁰⁵ M. L. Roi, ‘Russia: The Greatest Arctic Power?’, 23 *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* (2010) 551–573, at 4 [doi: 10.1080/13518046.2010.525465]

¹⁰⁶ A. Sergunin and V. Konyshov, ‘Russia in search of its Arctic strategy: between hard and soft power?’, 4 *The Polar Journal* (2014) 69–87, at 1 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2014.913930]

¹⁰⁷ F. Lasserre, ‘La géopolitique de l’Arctique: sous le signe de la coopération’, *CERISCOPE Environnement*, 2014. [Online]. Available: <http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/environnement/content/part5/la-geopolitique-de-l-arctique-sous-le-signe-de-la-cooperation>. [Accessed: 04-Aug-2015].

Country	Ratification UNCLOS	Sovereignty claim presented	Sovereignty claim accepted
US	No	-	-
Russian Federation	1997	2001	-
Denmark	2004	2009-2014	2014 (North of Faeroe Islands)
Canada	2003	2013	-
Norway	1996	2006	2009

Table 1. UNCLOS and the Arctic Five (Source: own elaboration)

In fact, not only do the Arctic Five, view the region as a geographical entity that all Arctic actors have a legitimate right to get engaged in, but also they favour widened and deepened multilateral cooperation based on covering narratives of a common Arctic. At the same time, an ad hoc group of foreign affairs ministers and other top officials of the Arctic Five met in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008, to provide an early response to the situation, issuing a declaration affirming their commitment to the orderly settlement of overlapping claims in the Arctic.¹⁰⁸ The Ministers stated that the “law of the sea provides a solid foundation for the responsible management of the Arctic Ocean”, and that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the US is not part of the UNCLOS (See Table 1).

(c) Societal Hypothesis

Efforts to secure and protect the rights of indigenous peoples constitute another element of the Arctic Countries regime that is significant not only from the point of view of human rights but also has important links to environmental protection and sustainable development.¹¹⁰ Some initiatives in this area are Arctic-specific, as in the case of the proposed Nordic Saami Convention designed to protect the rights of Saami (especially those engaged in reindeer herding) living in Norway, Sweden and Finland.¹¹¹ Additionally, others are global as in the cases of the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The indigenous peoples of the Arctic have played leading roles in the mobilization of the indigenous peoples’

¹⁰⁸ V. Ingimundarson, ‘Managing a contested region: the Arctic Council and the politics of Arctic governance,’ 4 *Polar Journal* (2014) 183-98, at March [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2014.913918]

¹⁰⁹ Arctic Ocean Conference, *The Ilulissat Declaration*, Ilulissat, 2008

¹¹⁰ A. B. Rosamond and B. Rosamond, ‘New Political Community and Governance at the Top of the World,’ in C. Kinnvall and T. Svensson (eds) *Governing Borders and Security: the Politics of Connectivity and Dispersal* (Routledge, New York, 2015) at 135-52.

¹¹¹ M. Åhrén, M. Scheinin, and J. B. Henriksen, ‘The Nordic Sami Convention: International Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central Provisions,’ 3 *Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights* (2007) 1-39, at 1.

movement on a global scale. Given the importance of subsistence activities in the lives of the indigenous or aboriginal peoples of the Arctic, measures designed to protect indigenous rights form an important element of the Arctic regime complex.¹¹² In short, the rights of indigenous people are seen as an inherent part of soft or customary international law.¹¹³ In fact, there is a multilateral institution like the Inuit Circumpolar Council (where the US, Denmark, Canada and the Russian Federation are part of it) that issued a Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty recognizing the valuable role of indigenous people.

(d) *Economic Hypothesis*

In the Arctic, perceived threats connected to economic security are based on issues challenging the access to off-shore raw materials or control over maritime routes. Therefore, what is the impact of securitization in multilateral institutions? Firstly, shipping in the Arctic is currently covered under the terms of a set of Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters (being voluntary rather than mandatory) adopted in 2002 and revised in 2009 under the auspices of the IMO.¹¹⁴ At the same time, a legally binding Polar Code dealing with the design, construction and operation of ships operating in the polar water has been reached in 2014 under the auspices of the IMO.¹¹⁵ Secondly, oil and gas development in the Arctic will occur either on land or in offshore areas located within the EEZs of the Arctic coastal states (e.g. oil in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas or gas in the Barents Sea). The regulatory regimes applicable to such activities will be those of the respective coastal states.¹¹⁶ Moreover, being oil and gas development a matter of international concern, particularly regarding transportation systems and the dangers of pollution arising both from normal operations and from accidents in 2010, Arctic Countries adopted ISO 19.906 “Petroleum and natural gas industries: Arctic offshore structures” in order “to ensure that offshore structures in Arctic and cold regions provide an appropriate level of reliability with respect to personnel safety, environmental protection and asset value to the owner, to the industry and to society in general”.¹¹⁷ Similarly, the Arctic Council has also launched in 2013 an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in

¹¹² O. R. Young, ‘Building an international regime complex for the Arctic: current status and next steps’, 2 *The Polar Journal* (2012) 391-407, at 2 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2012.735047]

¹¹³ C. K. Ebinger and E. Zambetakis, ‘The geopolitics of Arctic melt’, 85 *International Affairs* (2009) 1215-1232, at 6 [doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00858.x]

¹¹⁴ All Arctic Countries are part of this UN body.

¹¹⁵ K. Mathiesen, ‘Polar code agreed to prevent Arctic environmental disasters’ *The Guardian*, 2014. Available: [Accessed: 05-Aug-2015].

¹¹⁶ L. Huskey, ‘Globalization and the Economies of the North,’ in L. Heininen (eds), *Globalization of the Circumpolar North* (University of Alaska Press, Fairbanks, 2010) at 57-90.

¹¹⁷ ISO, “Petroleum and natural gas industries: Arctic offshore structures (ISO 19906),” 2010.

the Arctic.¹¹⁸ Finally, the Bering Sea and the Norwegian/Barents Sea areas are sites of world-class commercial fisheries. The question then is whether to take regulatory action in anticipation of such developments and if so, whether such measures should involve Arctic-wide initiatives or focus on specific sectors of the Arctic. However, the US is the only Arctic state that has declared a moratorium on commercial fishing in the Beaufort Sea area at least until more is known about the biology of potential fisheries in that area.¹¹⁹

(e) *Environmental Hypothesis*

The environment is a main topic of debate in Arctic Council meetings,¹²⁰ and a number of relevant global conventions apply to the Arctic where Arctic Countries (all of them or partially) are parties. These are the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; the CBD a broad range of conventions and other instruments adopted by the IMO; the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and its 1996 Protocol; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance.¹²¹ At the same time, I find non-binding instruments included: the Declaration of Principles and Agenda 21 adopted by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development; the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities; as well as the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and its Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Some regional conventions are also relevant, including the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic Convention and the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North East Atlantic Fisheries, both of which extend to parts of the Arctic region.¹²²

The point is that the Arctic is not a *terra nullius*. Hans Corell the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the UN, argues that UNCLOS, together with international treaties including the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, the Vienna

¹¹⁸ The Arctic Council, *Kiruna Declaration*, Kiruna, 2013

¹¹⁹ D. Avango, A. E. Nilsson, and P. Roberts, 'Assessing Arctic futures: voices, resources and governance', 3 *The Polar Journal* (2015) 1-16, at 2 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.790197]

¹²⁰ The Arctic Council, *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council*, Ottawa, 1993

¹²¹ S. Kirchner, 'Environmental and human security in the Arctic', 4 *The Polar Journal* (2014) 1-10, at 1 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2014.913922]; A.-M. Brady, 'Arctic security in a time of climate change', 3 *The Polar Journal* (2013) 1-2, at 1 [doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.783272]; and S. Cavalieri and R. A. Kraemer, 'Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean', 135 *NATO Science Peace Security* (2013) 281-93

¹²² L. A. de La Fayette, 'Oceans Governance in the Arctic', 23 *International Journal of Maritime Coastal* (2008) 531-66.

Convention, the Stockholm Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity, provide a sufficient framework by which the Arctic environment can be protected.¹²³

(C) CONCLUSION

To conclude, this paper explores the tension between institutional integration and interstate bargaining in Arctic politics by focusing on the Arctic securitization and on the impact in multilateral institutions. Despite the growing agenda of securitization, multilateral institutions continue to shape Arctic governance answering why securitization has not diminished multilateral participation. More precisely, whether multilateral cooperation will prevail over or at least complement national economic and security ambitions in the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem, is an often spotlighted but principally hypothetical. To shed light on this issue, I argued that foreign policy strategies on both sides of the Arctic Ocean are underpinned by a distinct “spatial logic” that drives state behaviour in a fuzzy definition of Arctic territory and accounts for recent region-building dynamics. At the same time, geopolitics is an intrinsic part of securitization in Arctic Affairs. In fact, the term geopolitics became something of a buzzword with respect to the Arctic Circle. Since Roucek first deployed the concept in this setting under the impression of a deterministic Cold War dichotomy, the term itself has been poorly conceptualized when it comes to governing the so-called last frontier.¹²⁴ Indeed, regarding Arctic geopolitics, Chaturvedi defines it as a historically contingent, but ongoing, political project of scripting, staging, and projection of the circumpolar northern polar region.¹²⁵

That is to say, the Arctic Countries take a central role in this process, and especially the forms and effects of national spatial thinking in the wake of climate-induced political challenges and opportunities significantly impacting contemporary regional governance configurations deserve further investigation. I mean by that, the development of Arctic affairs since the end of the Cold War and the analysed period in this paper are analysed among a securitization nexus where the intersubjective construction of an Arctic spatial order affecting directly the security agenda. Nevertheless, this paper has found that securitization does not necessary leads into confrontation. But, threats can appear endangering possible common policy objectives. The securitization of the Arctic is spilling over into jurisdictional disputes of who exercises sovereignty over continental shelves where the US is the only state

¹²³ H. Corell, ‘Reflections on the possibilities and limitations of a binding legal regime’, 37 *Environmental Policy Law* (2007) 321–24, at 4

¹²⁴ J. S. Roucek, ‘The Geopolitics of the Aleutians’, 50 *The Journal of Geography* (1951) 463–71, at 4 [doi: 10.1080/00221345108982630].

¹²⁵ S. Chaturvedi, ‘Arctic Geopolitics’ in M. Nuttall (eds) *Encyclopedia of the Arctic* (Routledge, New York, 2005) at 724–730.

that has securitized the sector and is diminishing its multilateral participation by not being part of the UNCLOS. Arctic resources might be technically accessible, cost-efficiently, and worth exploiting. It is a matter of time for some of the actors to play the security card. In 2007, we had the Russian flag-planting incident. Few years after the event, almost all Arctic Countries have published a foreign policy strategy towards the Arctic clarifying interests, policy aims, security challenges and relevant modes of governance.

Furthermore, according to the conceptualization of securitization and multilateralism, it is clear that realist theories predicted rising tensions in Arctic waters due to competing and, infrequently, overlapping territorial or economic claims. However, it is quite the contrary, what I can observe is widened and deepened multilateral cooperation among Arctic Countries, but I identify the Arctic Five moving to an exclusive club of actors. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation is securitizing its military sector but is not diminishing its multilateral participation in such sector. The Russian language regarding the Arctic military sector is quite similar to the language employed in the Ukraine crisis; nevertheless, a conflict will not take place, because actors accept the role of institutions as the arena to solve their disputes opting therefore for soft rather than hard power.

Future research, however, will have to investigate the content and character of other actor's articulation. There is a lot of room for further investigation in some fields. For instance, when it comes to those third actors entering the Arctic stage (e.g. Japan, India and People's Republic of China) do they further trigger or impede Arctic cooperation? Do they have an impact at all? Another field of research remaining to be explored is related to the idea of the prevailing media discourse seen as reluctant to think otherwise about the Arctic as the testimony to the power or securitising utterances and the associate technologies through which the Arctic is constituted, represented and reproduced.